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# Tunnel of Terror: “The Big Dig” Ceiling Tile Collapse

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
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# The Ceiling Collapse

- In 1999, the suspension of concrete panels from the ceiling of tunnels running beneath the city of Boston, MA, completed the most expensive roadway project in U.S. history (est. \$15 billion).
- The Big Dig project, as this project for the I-90 connector tunnel had become known, had finished over budget and behind schedule.




- At approximately 11 p.m. on July 10, 2006, four concrete panels detached from the ceiling of the tunnel and fell onto traffic below.
- At least 3 concrete panels with a combined mass of 24,000 lbs crushed a passing car, killing the passenger and injuring the driver.



# Critical Choice of Materials

- The suspended concrete panel design was devised to assist airflow as part of the tunnel's ventilation system.
- Each panel weighed between 5,000 to 6,000 lbs and was secured to the ceiling with bolts and epoxy adhesive.
- A "Fast Set" epoxy formulation manufactured by Power Fasteners Incorporated was used instead of the "Standard" epoxy formulation utilized in most tunnel ceiling applications.
- The "Fast Set" epoxy was more susceptible to creep and not suitable for the application. The installation team claimed to be unaware of the different properties between the two epoxies.
- The anchor bolts ultimately pulled out due to epoxy creep. Post failure inspections discovered that a significant number of anchor bolts were similarly affected.





## Proximate Cause

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- The epoxy adhesive securing the anchor bolts underwent creep deformation and fracture, allowing the 5,000 – 6,000 lb concrete panels to pull free from the ceiling.

## Root Cause/Underlying Issues

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- Design flaws and ineffective communication of hazards.
  - Project engineers were cited to have expressed concerns that the heavy concrete panels were inherently hazardous.
  - No documentation was provided by the supplier to clearly distinguish between the different epoxy formulations.
  - Neither the contractors nor design consultant questioned which type of epoxy was used.
- Independent verification was bypassed, and no subsequent inspections were performed.
  - The Massachusetts Highway Department chief engineer abrogated his independent role and allowed the MTA to certify safety on his behalf.
  - After the initial installation tests in 1999, no inspection or testing occurred over the next 7 years.
- Reduced margins on critical components increased the susceptibility to creep.
  - Under cost and schedule pressure, the number of anchor bolts was cut by 40%.
  - The lack of side supports for the ceiling panels resulted in a single point failure mode.
- Management ignored advice to conduct annual inspections of bolted ceiling systems.
  - The NTSB cited the MTA for failing to inspect the ceiling despite known failures of similar systems and warnings from other MTA tunnel operators.





# NASA Applicability

- It is important not to allow cost and schedule pressures to overrule warnings of off-nominal behavior. “Listen to the hardware.”
- Reducing margins and factors of safety without warrant increases susceptibility to failure. Inherently hazardous designs should be thoroughly analyzed in the context of a worst case scenario.
- Components used in critical applications must be well understood. Engineers and project team members must have a deep understanding of all materials used as well as their key failure modes.
- Independent reviews and assurance should not be compromised in their depth of penetration, rigor, or frequency. Regular inspection and testing are critical components for proper maintenance.



*Post accident, thousands of anchor bolts were declared unreliable. A second mechanical expansion anchor bolt was ordered to be added to each suspect bolt, which cost \$54 million in the first year.*

*To date, litigation settlements have totaled over \$400 million.*